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Welcome to the pages of the interdisciplinary research project Knowing How and Knowing That!
hier: Darstellung der Ziele, Ergebnisse; Darstellung der konkreten Aktivitäten in den Abschnitten zu den Projektphasen) <-->According to traditional views 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' mark two strictly seperated spheres of human cognitive activities. Philosophical epistemology has mainly focussed on 'knowing that', in particular on scientific knowledge as the highest form of human knowledge. In contrast the manifold forms of 'knowing how', like playing the piano, riding a bike, or purposefully moving through a pedestrian area, appear only as a side note in epistemology. A certain questionable assumption concerning the connection of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' comes along with this: 'Knowing that' has the structure of sentences, it is available independent of the abilities in which it is actualised, and it is activated in the case of executing an ability.
In contrast it is therefore the goal of the project to emphasise 'knowing how' as a sphere of its own.
A new philosophical theory is aimed at by firstly analysing conceptual as well as non-conceptual parts of cognitive abilities, based on a structural theory of representation. Secondly, based on this survey, an empirical funded theory of concepts is to be elaborated, which understands concepts as mental representations. This theory shall, independent of linguistic capabilities, allow for a discrimination between pre-conceptual and concept-based abilities on the one hand and between these two forms of abilities and propositionally structured knowledge on the other hand.The methodical premise is that different mechanisms of internal representation are decisive for the difference between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. To demonstrate the usefulness of this assumption, two empirical sub-projects in the fields of psychology and brain sciences substantially complement the three philosophical sub-projects. A central object of investigation is the human sense of spatial orientation because it occurs in all forms: 1. to walk through a busy pedestrian area (the pre-conceptual ability of purposeful evasion), 2. to orientate oneself by means of noticeable objects (the concept-based spatial orientation using landmarks), and 3. to orientate oneself by means of a map (the knowledge-based spatial orientation).
<-->The project is characterised by the fruitful, interdisciplinary collaboration of philosophy, psychology, and brain sciences:
Prof. Dr. Andreas Bartels, Philosophy, University of Bonn
PD Dr. Mark May, Psychology, University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg
Prof. Dr. Albert Newen, Philosophy, University of Bochum
Prof. Dr. Dr. Kai Vogeley, Neuroscience, University of Cologne
Prof. Dr. Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz (Philosophy, University of Bonn) was
involved in the first phase of the project.